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Relying on the present literature, official statistics, and household survey data in the 
People’s Republic of China, this paper summarizes research findings on the relationship 
between urbanization, urban–rural inequality, and poverty, and provides further empirical 
evidence on the role of urbanization and government policies in urban poverty. Several 
conclusions can be drawn from. First, urbanization has a significant effect on reducing both 
poverty of rural residents and poverty of migrating peasants, and, consequently, has a 
positive effect on narrowing the rural–urban income or consumption gap. Urban labor 
markets play an important role in this effect. Second, urbanization is positively correlated 
with urban poverty. This can be explained by the competition between migrating peasants 
and urban workers in the labor market, and the failure of the government’s  
anti-poverty policies in urban areas. Third, the existence of an informal sector has a negative 
effect on the poverty of urban citizens. Being employed by the informal sector significantly 
increases the probability of falling into poverty for urban citizens. Fourth, the minimum wage 
has a positive effect on reducing urban poverty, while the effect of other policies, such as  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Between 1978 and 2012, the economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
witnessed radical structural changes and a rapid growth rate: the share of industrial 
gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 44.34% to 56.8%, and the share of  
the urban population jumped from 17.92% to 49.96% (NBSC 2013). Urbanization is 
considered to be an engine of economic growth in developing countries. Driven by 
policies of economic reforms and opening up, the structural changes ushered in an  
era of sustained and rapid economic growth for the PRC. As a consequence, rural and 
urban poverty declined dramatically. According to the PRC’s official statistics, the 
headcount ratio of rural poverty dropped from 30.7% in 1978 to less than 1% in 2008. 
Using the $1.25 poverty line (adjusted by purchasing power parity) of the World Bank, 
which was higher than the PRC’s rural poverty threshold, the achievement of poverty 
reduction is impressive (World Bank 2001). At the same time, the PRC’s economic 
growth was accompanied by rapid increases in income inequality. In particular, the 
urban–rural gap has mostly been widening, constituting the most important component 
of inequality in the PRC (Kanbur and Zhang 2004; Wan 2005). From 1978 to 2010,  
the urban–rural income and consumption ratios both maintained an upward trend, the 
latter being more notable than the former. Specifically, the urban–rural income ratio 
increased from 2.57 in 1978 to a peak value of 3.33 in 2007, and the consumption ratio 
increased from 2.90 in 1978 to the maximum value of 3.83 in 2003.  
To understand these important observations, one needs to inquire into the role played 
by urbanization in economic growth, poverty reduction, and the evolution of inequality 
in the PRC. This paper summarizes research findings on the relationship between 
urbanization, interregional and urban–rural inequality, and poverty. Section 2 analyzes 
the relationship between urbanization, economic growth, and the evolution of inequality 
in the PRC, where the trends and spatial dimensions of poverty, inequality, and 
residential segregation within urban areas are covered, section 3 focuses on the urban 
labor market and urban poverty, where the role of the informal sector and rural–urban 
migration in reducing urban poverty are empirically tested using household data. 
Section 4 portrays the multifaceted nature of poverty in the process of urbanization, 
including consumption poverty, chronic poverty, transient poverty, vulnerability to 
poverty, and housing poverty; and section 5 analyzes the effect of some anti-poverty 
and inequality policies in the context of urbanization, such as employment-related 
programs, minimum living standards, and minimum wages.  
The empirical test in this paper relies on two main data sources. First, macroeconomic 
data were obtained from various publications of the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBSC). Second, the well-cited Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIPS) 
provides household data for 1995, 2002, and 2007, and is a subset of the nationwide 
household surveys conducted by the NBSC. CHIPS data cover about 10,000 rural  
and urban households in more than 10 provinces in the PRC. Information collected 
includes household characteristics, income, expenditures, job status, and 
entrepreneurial activities. 
2. URBANIZATION, GROWTH, AND INEQUALITY 
2.1 Urban–Rural and Interregional Inequality 
Over the past 3 decades, although the PRC has made significant achievements  
in promoting GDP growth and reducing rural poverty, its performance in reducing 
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inequality, especially between urban and rural areas, has been disappointing. Figure 1 
depicts the urban–rural ratio of per capita consumption and per capita income from 
1978 to 2010. It can be seen that the urban–rural gap in the consumption level was 
more pronounced than in the income level; furthermore, the urban–rural income ratio 
and consumption ratio experienced two clear decreasing trends in the early 1980s and 
the mid-1990s, as well as a slight downward trend in the first few years of the 21st 
century. The gap in both income and consumption between urban and rural residents 
showed an increasing trend, the income ratio rising from 2.57 in 1978 to a maximum 
value of 3.33 in 2007 and the consumption ratio rising from 2.90 in 1978 to a maximum 
value of 3.83 in 2003. This indicates that after the reforms and opening up in 1978, the 
PRC’s urban–rural gap in income and consumption expanded overall.  
Figure 1: Rural–Urban Income and Consumption Ratio, 1978–2010 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
The urban–rural income and consumption ratio cannot provide a comprehensive 
description of inequality in the PRC. Table 1 shows the Gini index published by the 
World Bank. These Gini coefficients are based on three different data sources. From 
1981 to 2002, all Gini coefficients exhibited a clear upward trend, but after 2002, all 
Gini coefficients began to show a downward trend. Therefore, inequality in the PRC 
begins to show a decreasing trend at the beginning of the 21st century, irrespective of 
the index used to depict inequality. This trend is believed to be partly associated with a 
basket of policies favoring peasants and agricultural production, including rural tax 
reforms and agricultural subsidies.  
Table 1: Gini Index in the PRC, 1981–2005 
 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
Source 1 29.1 27.7 31.7 32.7 38 34.9 38.9 53.6 39.8 
Source 2 29.11 27.69 29.85 32.43 35.5 35.7 39.23 42.59 42.48 
Source 3 NA NA 30.1 34.84 41.96 39.8 41.64 46.3 39.78 
NA = not available. 
Notes: Source 1 refers to a new, relatively consistent Gini index created from all of the eight data sources available to 
Branko Milanovic, who provided these measures. Source 2 refers to the World Bank-based dataset that covers the 
period 1978–2011 and includes 124 countries. Source 3 is the World Income Distribution dataset that covers the period 
1980–2010 and includes 152 countries. 
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2.2 Poverty in Urban Areas 
There is a rich literature explaining the determinants of rural poverty in the PRC (Fan, 
Zhang, and Zhang 2000; Jalan and Ravallion 1998, 2000; Montalvo and Ravallion 
2009; Ravallion and Chen 2004; Rozelle, Zhang, and Huang 2000), so this paper will 
focus mainly on urban poverty in the PRC. Given the PRC’s gradual approach to 
reforms, its territory and population size, and very uneven development, serious and 
significant market fragmentation exist both across provinces and between urban and 
rural areas. Thus, it is important to consider differences in the price levels between 
rural and urban areas. Also, in order to compare household income across years, it is 
necessary to deflate household income with the consumer price index (CPI), using 
separate urban and rural CPIs with the base year of 2005. To be able to describe 
poverty in the PRC, we need to convert international poverty lines into local currency. 
To begin with, when we measure the poverty rate by the commonly used $1.25 per day 
threshold, purchasing power parity (PPP) rates reported by the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 1  typically result in a rural poverty rate beyond what is 
commonly perceived as the actual poverty rates in rural PRC. Thus, we use purchasing 
power parities derived from PovcalNet data. These were 4.02 for urban areas and 
2.95 for rural areas in 2005, compared to the official PPP rates of 4.09. 
We measure poverty by the headcount ratio, using international poverty lines. Table 2 
presents the profile of urban poverty in the PRC. Several observations are immediately 
evident from Table 2. From 1995 to 2007, urban households experienced phenomenal 
poverty reduction. In 1995, less than 4% of urban households remained below $1.25 a 
day, and the proportion of poor urban households under $1.25 a day dropped 
substantially to only 0.14% in 2007. More impressively, the share of urban households 
that remained below $2 a day dropped sharply from more than 16% to nearly 1%.  
Table 2: Poor Households in Urban PRC (%) 
Per capita daily income (2005 PPP) 1995 2002 2007 
$1.25 3.03 1.87 0.14 
$2 16.46 7.26 1.16 
PPP = purchasing power parity, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIPS) data. 
2.3 Inequality in Urban Areas 
The average wage of urban workers in the PRC increased from CNY615 in 1978 to 
CNY47,593 in 2012 (NBSC 2013). Accompanying this unprecedented growth was a 
considerable increase in income inequality. Figure 2 depicts the trends of the provincial 
Gini and Theil indices in urban areas in the past 2 decades. It shows that inequality in 
urban PRC has an increasing trend over time. The Gini index has the same pattern as 
that of the Theil index. Thus, it can be concluded that the increasing inequality in urban 
areas from the early 1990s is a stylized fact in the PRC. The urbanization process 
plays an important role in enlarging inequality in the PRC. For example, using the 
sample of the 2005 population census in the PRC, Chen, Liu, and Lu (2014) examined 
the relationship between income inequality and city size and found that overall income 
inequality is higher for larger cities. In addition, they identified the potential channels 
through which city size can affect inequality and found that education, migration, and 
1  Based on the findings of the 2005 International Comparison Program (ICP). 
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the degree of ownership restructuring together can explain most of the correlation 
between city size and inequality. Rising housing prices during the process of 
urbanization and marketization can also help explain the increasing inequality in urban 
areas of the PRC. One important issue is asset inequality. For example, urbanization 
improves the demand for housing. As a result, it improves the asset inequality of urban 
citizens. Accompanying this process, the privatization of public houses also plays an 
important role in enlarging asset inequality. Using CHIPS 1995 and 2002 data, Li, Wei, 
and Ding (2005) mapped the asset inequality of urban households and found that the 
privatization of public housing in urban PRC enlarged the rural–urban asset inequality, 
and that the inequality of financial assets will play a more important role in driving the 
inequality of gross assets in the PRC. Similarly, using a unique set of repeated cross-
sectional data, Meng, Shen, and Xue (2013) examined the causes of this increase in 
urban workers’ earnings inequality and found that the major changes occurred in the 
1990s when the labor market moved from a centrally planned system to a market-
oriented system. 
Figure 2: Inequality in Urban PRC, 1991–2010 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Sources: Author’s calculation using household grouped data from the Statistical Yearbook of the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, various issues. 
2.4 Spatial Dimensions of Urban Poverty 
Given the PRC’s territory and population size and very uneven development, poor 
households are not equally distributed across urban areas. Employing CHIPS 1995 
and CHIPS 2002, we have mapped the regional distribution of poverty in the urban 
PRC, where household welfare is measured by consumption expenditure, and both 
$1.25 and $2 poverty lines are adopted. Table 3 shows that consumption poverty in 
urban PRC is mainly concentrated in the central areas, followed by western areas and 
then eastern areas. 
In addition, we employed the PRC General Social Survey (CGSS) 2006 data to further 
map urban poverty in the PRC. Table 4 presents the results, where we can find that, 
most of the urban households under $1.25 and $2 poverty lines are distributed in the 
central and western PRC, and the poverty rate in the eastern PRC is the lowest. So, 
the regional distribution pattern revealed in Table 4 is nearly the same as that shown  
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Table 3: Expenditure Cutoffs for Defining Urban Poverty, 1995 and 2002 (%) 
 











$1.25 6.18 1.10 3.71 1.36 
$2.00 25.24 4.54 13.37 7.32 
2002 
$1.25 3.17 0.51 1.95 0.72 
$2.00 14.07 2.44 7.85 3.79 
Source: Calculated from the Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIPS) 1995 and 2002 urban samples. 
Table 4: Distribution of Income Poverty using CGSS 2006 Data (%) 
Per capita daily income East  Central  West  
$1.25 1.02 2.54 1.81 
$2.00 3.79 9.24 4.40 
CGSS = Chinese General Social Survey. 
Source: Calculated from the CGSS 2006 urban sample. 
2.5 Impact of Urbanization on Poverty and Inequality 
Before examining the effects of the PRC’s urbanization on poverty and inequality,  
we need to resolve the problem of data issues. The NBSC does not report provincial 
measures of poverty and inequality, such as the Gini or Theil indices. In order to 
resolve this problem, we first tried to calculate the provincial index of poverty and 
inequality based on present statistics.2 These are headcount ratios measured by the 
$1.25 and $2.00 poverty lines (2005 PPP), the Gini index, and the Theil index. These 
values were estimated from grouped household income data published by national and 
provincial bureaus of statistics in the PRC. With these provincial-level data at hand, we 
can empirically test the relationship between urbanization and poverty and inequality in 
the PRC. 
Figure 3: Urbanization and Rural Poverty 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
2  The method of calculating the provincial poverty and inequality index is introduced in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3 describes the relationship between urbanization and the headcount ratio in 
rural PRC measured by the $2 poverty line. From Figure 3, we can see that rural 
poverty is negatively correlated with urbanization on the provincial level, suggesting 
that urbanization has an effect of reducing rural poverty. 
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between urbanization and the rural–urban gap, 
showing a negative relationship between them, which suggests that urbanization also 
has an effect of reducing rural–urban income gaps. This result is consistent with 
Figure 3, which shows that urbanization can reduce rural poverty. 
Figure 4: Urbanization and the Rural–Urban Income Gap 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
Figures 5 and 6 describe the relationship between urbanization and the Gini index and 
the Theil index at the provincial level, indicating a similar conclusion as that from 
Figure 4. These results can be explained by the structural change in urban sectors 
during the process of urbanization. A large proportion of surplus rural labor migrates to 
urban PRC and works there with higher wage incomes. As a result, the migrants suffer 
less poverty than those staying back in their hometowns, and this decreases inequality 
in the PRC, especially rural–urban inequality. 
Figure 7 describes the relationship between urbanization and urban poverty, where 
again we find a negative relationship between them, indicating that higher urbanization 
is correlated with lower urban poverty. 
However, Figures 3–7 only provide a very preliminary description of the effect of 
urbanization on poverty and inequality. The negative correlation does not necessarily 
suggest that urbanization can reduce poverty and inequality in general. In order to get 
robust conclusions, we ran some regressions to see if these conclusions still hold when 
some other variables are controlled. All variables in the regressions are defined in 
Table A2 in the Appendix, and the regression results of the fixed effect and random 
effect models are presented in Tables A3 and A4, respectively. From these regression 
results, we can generate the following conclusions: First, urbanization can help reduce 
rural poverty. Second, urbanization can reduce the rural–urban gap, and the provincial 
Gini index and Theil index. Third, we find that urbanization increases urban poverty 
rather than reducing it. This can be explained by two facts. First, the structural changes, 
especially in the late 1990s, created a lot of jobless growth, while the government’s 
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social protection system lagged behind the transition of the economy. Consequently, 
the poverty of urban households worsened rather than decreased in some periods. 
Second, a large number of migrating peasants entered the urban labor market and 
competed for job opportunities with urban citizens, which decreased the welfare of 
some urban workers and, as a result, increased urban poverty. Employing the urban 
sample from the population census of 2005, Liu and Zhao (2009) investigated the 
effect of rural–urban migration on the employment rate and wages of urban workers 
and found that, other things being equal, a 10% increase in rural–urban labor migration 
resulted in a 0.3% decrease in the employment rate for urban workers and a 0.65% 
decrease in the wages of urban workers. 
Figure 5: Urbanization and the Gini Index 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
Figure 6: Urbanization and the Theil Index 
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Figure 7: Urbanization and Urban Poverty 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
2.6 Segregation Issues in Terms of the Location of Poor 
Households within Cities 
Ghetto housing in urban areas is believed to be harmful in reducing poverty and 
inequality, and is an obstacle to the building of a harmonious society; residential 
segregation is highly correlated with ghetto housing in developed and developing 
economies (Collins and Margo 2000; Wilson 1987; Haynie 2002; Haynie and Osgood 
2005; Warr 2002). With rapid urbanization in the PRC, residential segregation has 
become a serious issue. Only micro data with residential locations can be used to 
measure residential segregation. Unfortunately, we do not have such data. So, we next 
provide only some evidence of spatial clustering that reflects the residential 
segregation problem in urban PRC. Using the CHIPS 2002 data, Table 7 presents the 
residential distribution of poor households in urban PRC. Three conclusions can be 
generalized from this table. First, moving from the center of the city to the suburbs, the 
headcount ratio shows an increasing trend, with a few exceptions. Second, this pattern 
does not change whether poverty is measured by the $1.25 poverty line or the 
$2.00 poverty line. Third, the distribution pattern also does not change if poverty is 
measured by daily consumption, rather than daily income, although the absolute level 
of the headcount ratio is much higher when consumption is employed to measure 
poverty. The pattern indicated in Table 7 suggests that there is very clear residential 
clustering in urban PRC.  
Table 7: Residential Clustering of Poor Urban Households 
 Income Poverty (%) Consumption Poverty (%) 
 Pov_$1.25 Pov_$2 Pov_$1.25 Pov_$2 
Center of the city 1.34 5.74 3.32 15.03 
In city 1.24 6.80 3.75 16.69 
In near suburbs 2.07 7.40 4.73 16.72 
In outer suburbs 0.78 6.98 16.28 28.68 
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During the urbanization process in the PRC, a huge number of peasants migrated  
to urban labor markets, but they could not join the social protection system meant  
for urban citizens. So, in urban PRC, residential clustering and segregation not only  
exists between urban citizens but also between urban citizens and migrating peasants. 
Using a 2006–2007 urban household survey in Shanghai and Shenzhen, Chen, Lu, 
and Chen (2013) found evidence that residential segregation between migrating 
peasants and urban households already exists in these two cities, where migrating 
peasants have worse living conditions, a lower evaluation of their residential quarters, 
and lower trust in their neighborhoods. Similarly, using the samples in Shanghai from 
the 2010 population census in the PRC, Chen and Hao (2014) found that more 
migrating peasants live outside the downtown area. They further examined the level  
of residential segregation in 2010 in Shanghai and found that residential segregation 
between locals and migrating peasants is already serious in Shanghai and has 
accelerated in recent years. 
3. URBAN LABOR MARKET AND POVERTY 
3.1 Urban Informal Sector Employment and Poverty  
According to Harris and Todaro (1970), the urban labor market in developing 
economies is generally segmented into an informal market and a formal market. 
Specifically, the formal labor market provides high wage jobs with better working 
conditions, and workers have more opportunities to be promoted. On the contrary, the 
informal labor market only provides low wage jobs with worse working conditions, and 
workers have very few opportunities to be promoted. So, having opportunities to be 
employed by the formal labor market is very crucial for workers’ wages and related 
welfare and, as a result, it is an important determinant of urban poverty. Most 
economists agree that the urban labor market in the PRC is a segmented one (Cai 
2000; Wang and Zuo 1999; Yang and Chen 2000; Yan 2006). 
In order to investigate the role of the informal sector in urban poverty, we first need a 
classification of the formal and informal sectors. In the present literature, Yan (2006) 
classifies most of the public sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as the formal 
sector, and small and medium-sized enterprises as the informal sector. Following  
this definition, and taking into account the available information in CHIPS 2002, we 
classify the following units as comprising the formal sector: first, workers in the party 
and government bodies; second, workers in government or collective institutions; third, 
workers in solely SOEs; fourth, workers in state-controlled enterprises; and fifth, 
workers in any other unit with more than 100 employees. Workers who do not belong to 
any one of these five categories are in the informal sector. Using this definition and the 
urban household samples from CHIPS 2002,3 we find that the number of household 
members being employed in the informal sector is positively correlated with income 
and consumption poverty, and the ratio of household members in the informal sector is 
also positively correlated with poverty. We can thus conclude that more household 
members being employed in the informal sector significantly improves the probability of 
falling into poverty for an urban household. 
  
3  The headcount ratio in 2007 was low, so we only employ CHIPS 2002 rather than CHIPS 2007 to 
examine the role of the informal sector in poverty and poverty reduction in urban areas of the PRC. 
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In order to get more robust results, we employed probit models to investigate if being 
employed by the informal sector increases the probability of falling into poverty for  
an urban household. In the regression models, the dependent variable is whether an 
urban household is poor, measured by per capita income or consumption level,  
using the $1.25 and $2.00 poverty lines. We measured the effect of employment by  
the informal sector by two variables. The first one is no_informal, indicating the gross 
number of household members working in the informal sector and the second  
one is ratio_informal, indicating the share of household members employed in the 
informal sector. The variables age, age_square, male, edu_year, partymember, and 
minority indicate characteristics of the household head—age, squared term of age, 
gender, years of schooling, whether a member of the Communist Party (CCP), and 
whether a minority, respectively. The variable depend_ratio measures the dependent 
ratio of a household. east and central are regional dummies representing eastern and 
central PRC. 
Table A5 in the appendix presents the regression results of the probit models. The 
following conclusions can be deduced: First, no_informal and ratio_informal are 
significant in all models, suggesting that more household members being employed in 
the informal sector significantly improves the probability of falling into poverty for an 
urban household. Second, most of characteristics of the household head are significant. 
Age of household head in the equation of $2 poverty has a reversed U-shape 
relationship with the probability of falling into poverty. Schooling years has a significant 
effect on reducing poverty. Being a party member of the CCP can also reduce poverty. 
A higher dependent ratio results in more poverty. These results all coincide with those 
from the present literature.  
3.2 Rural to Urban Migration and Urban Poverty 
In 2012, there were 260 million migrating peasants working in urban labor markets 
(NBSC 2013). The present literature on rural poverty generally finds that migrating  
into urban labor markets can help rural households escape from poverty. On the one 
hand, the empirical test in section 2.1 indicates that being employed by the informal 
sector improves the probability of falling into poverty for urban households. On the 
other hand, the present literature does not provide evidence that migrating into urban 
areas can help migrating peasants escape from poverty. We next employed household 
samples in CHIPS 2007 to investigate the determinants of poverty of migrating 
peasants. 
Migrating peasants cannot join the urban social protection system and have no  
equal access to public goods in the urban PRC. In most cases, parents and children  
of migrating peasants do not migrate together with them to urban areas. When 
measuring their poverty, we do not use per capita income, but use individual income to 
quantify migrating peasants’ welfare level—that is, here we measure individual poverty 
rather than household poverty.  
In the questionnaire of CHIPS 2007 for migrating peasants, there is an interesting 
question: if a migrating peasant did not leave his or her hometown, how much does he 
or she earn in a month? This information can be used to measure their poverty at home 
and compare it with their monthly income after migrating to urban areas. This way, we 
can gauge the effect of migration on poverty reduction and understand the relationship 
between rural–urban migration and urban poverty. Table 8 presents the headcount 
ratio of migrating households. Using monthly wage after migrating into urban areas to 
measure poverty, and adopting the $1.25 poverty line, we found that only 0.081% of 
migrants fall into poverty, and adopting the $2 poverty line, only 0.42% of migrants are 
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poor, which indicates that most migrant workers are not poor at all. However, if we use 
monthly wage at home to measure poverty, the headcount ratio will increase very 
sharply to more than 8% or about 14%, respectively. This comparison suggests that 
rural–urban migration can help migrating peasants escape poverty. 
Table 8: Headcount Ratio of Migrating Peasants, 2007 
 $1.25 (%) $2.00 (%) 
Monthly wage at home 8.04 13.85 
Monthly wage after migrating into urban areas 0.081 0.42 
Source: Calculated from migrant samples in the Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2007. 
According to Harris and Todaro (1970), the informal labor market in developing 
economies is very crucial for migrating peasants as it provides them some jobs in the 
early stage, although the wages are not very high and social protection is not very good. 
The present literature finds that most migrating workers are employed in the informal 
sector (Wang and Zuo 1999; Yang and Chen 2000; Yan 2006; Meng and Zhang 2001). 
During urbanization, the informal sector plays an important role in providing jobs for 
migrating peasants. Table 9 presents a statistical description of the migrating peasants 
in the formal and informal sectors.4 
Table 9: Characteristics of Migrating Peasants in the Informal  
and Formal Sectors 
 Informal Sector Formal Sector 
No. of observations 3,639 2,506 
Age 31.06 30.53 
female 42.07% 35.43% 
Health_soso 44.71% 43.38% 
Health_bad 15.11% 11.89% 
Health_verybad 1.70% 0.92% 
Edu_year 8.24 8.84 
Experience 3.88 3.37 
Work_hour 65.58 55.61 
Month_wage 1,655.26 1,485.02 
Home_wage 690.72 724.45 
Hourwage 6.18 6.65 
Source: Calculated from migrant samples in the Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2007. 
Table 9 indicates that more than half of migrating peasants are in the informal sector. 
This suggests that although wages are lower in the informal sector, they can provide 
jobs to migrating peasants with very low education or bad health conditions and 
provide more job opportunities for male peasants. The existence of the informal sector, 
therefore, is very crucial for migrating peasants, although it has a significant effect on 
increasing the probability of falling into poverty for urban citizens. 
4  The questionnaire for migrating peasants and urban citizens are different, so the definition of a formal 
sector for migrating peasants is slightly different from that for urban citizens in that for migrating 
peasants, if the gross number of employees of a company or organization is higher than 50, it is 
regarded as a formal sector, while for urban citizens, if the gross number of employees of a company or 
organization is higher than 100, it is regarded as a formal sector. 
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4. MULTIFACETED NATURE OF POVERTY 
AND URBANIZATION 
4.1 Consumption Poverty  
Households having a daily income higher than $2 may consume less than $2 a day 
because of illness, lack of social protection, debt crisis, or other negative shocks. In this 
case, their welfare level is still under the poverty line. Thus, income poverty may 
conceal or underestimate the true situation. Employing the CHIPS 2002–2007, Table 
10 presents the headcount ratios measured by daily income and daily consumption, 
where $1.25 and $2.00 poverty lines are adopted. We can see that headcount ratios 
measured by consumption level are much higher than those measured by income level. 
This pattern applies to both rural and urban areas in the PRC. 
Table 10: Consumption vs. Income Poverty 
   CHIPS 2002 (%) CHIPS 2007 (%) 
Income 
$1.25 
Urban 1.87 0.14 
Rural 21.71 2.81 
$2.00 
Urban 5.39 1.02 
Rural 26.33 8.25 
Consumption 
$1.25 
Urban 2.91 3.30 
Rural 58.82 11.30 
$2.00 
Urban 12.99 9.52 
Rural 81.79 34.37 
Source: Calculated from the rural and urban samples in the Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002 and 2007. 
In the present urban PRC, consumption poverty is more serious in the case of 
migrating peasants because, while they work in urban areas, they cannot join the  
social protection system for urban citizens. As a result, they may have a daily income 
higher than $2, but have daily consumption levels under $2. Using the migrating 
peasants sample in CHIPS 2007, Table 10 presents their income structure and 
consumption structure.  
Table 11 shows that in 2007, the household average net income for migrating peasants 
was CNY26,270, where CNY17,397 came from wage income, accounting for nearly 70% 
of the total net income. In the total net income, CNY15,987 was consumed, where 
consumption on food, clothes, and residence comprised the main component of total 
consumption expenditure, and the share of expenditures on durable goods, medicine 
and medical services was relatively low. 
According to Table 11, we can calculate the gross savings rate of migrating peasants 
at 39.14%. Table 12 presents the gross savings rate of urban households and rural 
households. This comparison shows that the gross savings rate of migrant peasants is 
the highest. Although the gross savings rate of urban households is higher than that of 
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Table 11: Net Income, Consumption, and Their Composition  
for Migrating Peasants 
(CNY) 
Net income 26,270.28 
 Wage income 17,397.12 
 Net income from household business 8,407.2 
 Property income 279.84 
 Transfer income 186.12 
Consumption expenditure 15,987.07 
 Food 6,262.44 
 Clothes 1,739.88 
 Living expenditure 3,153.84 
 Durable goods 820.44 
 Consumer goods and service 702.19 
 Medicine and health care 699.55 
 Traffic expenditure 667.60 
 Communications expenditure 890.97 
 Entertainment and cultural expenditure 245.89 
 Education expenditure 557.27 
 Insurance expenditure 79.90 
 Other consumption expenditure 167.10 
Remittance back to hometown 2,458.68 
Deposit 1,118.74 
Note: All expenditures were calculated from monthly into annual values. There are 5,000 urban household samples in 
the Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2007. 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
Table 12: Savings Rate of Migrating Peasants, Urban Residents,  
and Rural Residents, 2007 
 Migrating Peasants 
(%)  
Urban Residents  
(%) 
Rural Residents  
(%) 
Gross savings rate 39.14% 27.48% 22.14% 
Note: Gross savings rates of urban residents and rural residents have been calculated by the statistics from the China 
Statistical Yearbook (2008). 
Contrary to a high savings rate, migrating peasants have very low expenditure on 
durable goods. Table 13 presents the ownership of durable goods for migrating 
peasants, urban households, and rural households in 2007. From Table 13, we can 
see that the ownership of televisions, washing machines, motorcycles, and 
refrigerators for migrating peasants is much lower than that for rural households and 
urban households. There are some exceptions in that migrating peasants have greater 
ownership of cameras, personal computers, air conditioners, and mobile phones than 
rural households, which can be explained by the fact that the former use these durable 
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Table 13: Number of Durable Goods per 100 Households  
 Migrating Peasants Urban Residents Rural Residents 
Televisions 58.89 137.8 106.5 
Motorcycles  6.85 24.8 48.5 
Washing machines 18.83 96.8 45.9 
Refrigerators 17.80 95.0 26.1 
Cameras 7.01 45.1 4.3 
Personal computers 9.66 53.8 3.7 
Air conditioners 15.21 95.1 8.5 
Cell phones 118.44 165.2 77.8 
Audio 10.85 30.2 – 
Cars 1.38 6.1 – 
Water heaters 11.65 79.5 – 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2008). 
In the present literature, Chen, Lu, and Zhong (2014) proposed three channels through 
which the Hukou system (household registration system) constraints cause lower levels  
of consumption among migrating peasants in comparison with urban residents: 
precautionary saving motivation, lower permanent income, and lower incentive to 
consume durable goods. Employing CHIPS 2007 data, they provided empirical 
evidence indicating that these hypotheses cannot be rejected. Table 13 suggests that 
migrating peasants spend much less on durable goods than urban households and 
much less than rural households. This result can help explain the high and increasing 
savings rate in the PRC in the past decades.  
4.2 Other Dimensions of Poverty 
For Sen (1981), poverty is not low well-being, but the inability to pursue well-being 
because of the lack of economic means. Similarly, Blackwood and Lynch (1994)  
assert that poverty does not end abruptly once an additional dollar of income raises  
a family’s (or individual’s) income beyond a discretely defined poverty line. It is more 
accurate to conceive of poverty as a continuous function of varying gradation. As a 
multdimensional index, poverty can also be reflected by illness, illiteracy, or having no 
access to clean water or sanitation.  
Li and Knight (2002) examined the nature of poverty in the urban areas of the PRC. By 
combining income and consumption criteria, they distinguished between three types  
of poverty—chronic, transient, and voluntary.5 Chronic poverty refers to income levels 
and consumption levels being lower than the poverty line, transient poverty refers to 
income levels being lower than the poverty line and consumption levels being higher 
than the poverty line, and voluntary poverty refers to income levels being higher than 
the poverty line and consumption levels being lower than the poverty line. Employing 
1999 cross-section household survey data covering six provinces of the PRC, Li and 
Knight (2002) found that a large proportion of the poor are in voluntary poverty. 
 
5  Using panel data, another study also proposed similar terms with different means to describe the 
welfare of poor households. For example, a household being poor in most of the observation periods  
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Another dimension of poverty that needs to be addressed during urbanization of  
the PRC is housing poverty. For example, until 1978, the average living space per 
person in urban areas of the PRC was only 3.6 square meters (m2) (in terms of housing 
construction space, 6.7 m2), and 47.5% of urban households had living space less than 
2 m2 per person (Hou, Ying, and Zhang 1999). Over the last 2 decades, the PRC has 
experienced a drastic transformation of the housing system as well as rapid 
urbanization. A huge number of houses have been built during this period, 
accompanied by a rapid increase in housing prices, making home purchases 
increasingly unaffordable for low-income households and particularly for young workers 
(Chen, Hao, and Stephens 2010). Meanwhile, most migrating peasants are excluded 
from the formal housing market, and they are concentrated in so-called “urban villages” 
(Zheng et al. 2009). According to an official report, in 2011, the private rental market 
accommodated only 37% of migrating peasants, while the rest mainly lived in 
overcrowded dorms or shanty sheds at their workplaces (PFPC 2012). Using survey 
data covering 13 cities in six provincial-level administrative units in 1999, Sato (2006) 
provided evidence that a new type of housing poverty has been emerging among 
migrating peasants in the late 1990s. It is not easy to set a relevant measurement of 
housing poverty applicable to the urban areas of the PRC. If the proportion of rent 
actually paid in total household expenditure is used as a simple measurement of 
housing poverty, and the poverty line is set at the 30% level, Sato (2006) found that  
28% of migrating peasants in Beijing are below the poverty line. No urban household in 
Beijing, by contrast, is under this poverty line. When the same housing poverty line is 
employed for 13 cities, 21% of the migrating peasants are in housing poverty, whereas 
no urban household living in rented housing is below the poverty line. Zhang and  
Chen (2014) provide further evidence from present-day Shanghai. Using a pool of 
household-level micro data from three waves of national population census (2000, 
2005, and 2010), they traced the evolution of housing overcrowding conditions in 
Shanghai and found that the overall incidence of overcrowding in Shanghai did not 
improve from 2000 to 2010. They also found that migrating peasants are more likely to 
be subject to the risks of overcrowding than urban citizens. 
5. ANTI-POVERTY (INEQUALITY) POLICIES  
(SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN POLICIES)  
IN THE CONTEXT OF URBANIZATION 
5.1 Employment-Related Programs 
Reforms in the urban sector, which started in the 1990s, brought not only many 
benefits to urban citizens but also some challenges. For example, economic reforms in 
1995–1999 created 24 million laid-off workers, and registered unemployment jumped 
from 3.8 million in 1990 to 5.8 million in 1999, a more than 50% growth in 9 years 
(NBSC 2000). Being laid-off or unemployed is a negative shock, which brings 
uncertainty of the job and wages for a household, and, as a result, may increase 
poverty. Employing a cross-section household survey covering six provinces of the 
PRC in 1999, Appleton, Song, and Xia (2005) found that even after being re-employed, 
wages of the unemployed or laid-off workers still decreased significantly. Table 14 
shows that the average annual wage of the laid-off workers is only about 27.6% of that 
of employed workers, and even slightly lower than that of unemployed. The laid-off 
workers are older than employed and unemployed workers and have fewer schooling 
years than employed workers. Adopting the $1.25 and $2.00 poverty lines, the 
headcount ratio of laid-off workers is surprisingly higher than that of employed workers. 
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Working or employed 12,108.10 40.48 11.41 1.49 3.57 
Laid-off (xia gang) 3,346.19 41.45 9.71 33.61 47.34 
Unemployed (shi ye) 3,700.40 38.67 9.88 34.16 44.27 
Source: Urban household sample from the Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002. 
In order to relieve the unrest caused by huge lay-offs, the central and local 
governments established the so-called “Service Center of Re-employment” (SCR)  
to provide help to the laid-off workers. There are some basic differences between  
laid-off workers and unemployed workers. First, unemployed workers terminate their 
employment relationship or terminate their contracts with employers, while laid-off 
works still have an employment relationship with their employers. Second, laid-off 
workers can still get a subsidy from their employers or from the SCR, and the SCR 
pays some insurance to them. Third, the SCR can provide job opportunities to the laid-
off workers. For example, the SCR can allocate jobs created by local governments to 
laid-off workers by discriminating against migrating peasants. Some statistics reveal 
that not all laid-off workers can get subsidy from the SCR. For example, according to 
official statistics, in 1999, about 40% of laid-off workers did not get any subsidy or a 
lower subsidy than the amount specified by the central government (NBSC 2000). This 
suggests that the effect of subsidies for laid-off workers on reducing urban poverty is 
not very positive. 
5.2 Minimum Wage and Poverty Reduction 
A minimum wage is a very common policy adopted by developed economies to protect 
the welfare of low-wage workers and also is used by policymakers to reduce poverty.  
It is thought to be effective at reducing poverty as it can guarantee the wages of 
employed workers. However, if the minimum wage is higher than the market-clearing 
level, dis-employment will be boosted in the labor market. Thus, the net effect of a 
minimum wage on poverty reduction is not straightforward. Addison and Blackburn 
(1999) adopted an approach that links increases in both federal and state minimum 
wages to contemporaneous changes in poverty rates in the United States, and found 
that in the period 1983–1996, the minimum wage had a poverty-reducing effect among 
teenagers and older junior high school dropouts. However, using data drawn from  
the March current population survey, Sabia and Burkhauser (2010) found that state 
and federal minimum wage increases between 2003 and 2007 had no effect on state 
poverty rates, which suggests that raising the federal minimum wage continues to be 
an inadequate way to help the working poor. Similarly, using 2004 survey data from 
Ontario, Canada, Mascella, Teja, and Thompson (2009) found that, first, over 80% of 
low wage earners are not members of poor households and, second, over 75% of poor 
households do not have a member who is a low wage earner. They also presented 
simulation results that suggested that even without any negative employment effects, 
planned increases in Ontario’s minimum wage will lead to virtually no reduction in the 
level of poverty. 
The PRC government issued the “Regulation of Minimum Wages” on 30 December 
2003, and put it into force from 1 March 2004. However, there is very little literature that 
investigates the role of the minimum wage in the PRC’s urban labor market. Using the 
1998–2007 industrial enterprises panel data, Ma, Zhang, and Zhu (2012) found that a 
10% increase in minimum wages significantly decreased the number of workers by 
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0.6%. To fill this gap in the literature, this subsection makes use of provincial panel 
data to investigate the effect of the minimum wage on urban poverty. 
We first plot the minimum wage and poverty ratio at the provincial level in Figure 8, 
where we find that there is a clear negative relationship between them, which suggests 
that the minimum wage has an effect of reducing urban poverty and this conclusion still 
holds when poverty is measured by different poverty lines. 
Figure 8: Relationship between Minimum Wage and Urban Poverty 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
In the Appendix, Table A6 presents the regression results, where the dependent 
variable is urban poverty rate at the provincial level and the key independent variable  
is logmini_wage indicating the provincial level of minimum wage, which is collected 
from the websites of provincial governments. The other 10 independent variables are 
controlled in the regression models, where urbanization measures the share of urban 
population; logavegdp measures the per capita GDP in logarithm; gdp1_ratio and 
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gdp2_ratio measure the share of primary GDP and industrial GDP in total GDP 
respectively; fdi_gdp, export_gdp, and import_gdp measure the ratio of foreign direct 
investment, export and import to total GDP respectively; and east, central, and 
timetrend are regional dummies and time trend respectively. From the regression 
results, we can see that minimum wage is significantly negative in all the models, 
suggesting that increasing minimum wage has a significant effect on reducing urban 
poverty. This conclusion still holds even we further control the disposable income of 
urban citizens and some other variables.  
5.3 Social Security 
From the 1990s, the economic restructuring and reform of SOEs in the urban areas of 
the PRC has led to widespread lay-offs, unemployment, and income insecurity. As a 
result, urban poverty increased in the 1990s. Using a large repeated cross-section 
household survey from 1986 to 2000, Meng, Gregory, and Wang (2005) mapped the 
changes in income, inequality, and poverty over the 15-year period and investigated 
the determinants of poverty in urban areas, and found that the reduction in social 
welfare provision, deregulation of grain prices, and increases in income uncertainty in 
the 1990s increased urban poverty. In order to guarantee the basic needs of urban 
citizens, the central and local governments set up the system of social assistance, 
Minimum Living Guarantee (Di Bao), in 1999 and brought all urban citizens into this 
system in 2003. Due to the lack of data, very few studies provide evidence on what 
effect Di Bao has had on reducing urban poverty. Using a survey covering large parts 
of the urban areas in 2002, Gustafsson and Deng (2007) investigated the factors 
affecting receipt and how receipt affects urban poverty. Results from estimating 
probability models indicate that Di Bao receipt is strongly linked to joblessness among 
household members. However, they also found that the Di Bao payments are small 
and many of the urban poor are not receivers, and, as a result, much urban poverty still 
remains. This indicates that the effect of Di Bao on reducing urban poverty is limited. 
In the urban PRC, another tool in the social security system is the unemployment 
subsidy or unemployment insurance. Unfortunately, its effect on urban poverty is weak. 
Official statistics suggest that in 1999, only 47% of the registered unemployed received 
an unemployment subsidy, and the level of subsidy was only CNY1,174, which is about 
12% of an urban citizen’s average wage income (NBSC 2000). Similarly, Li and Knight 
(2002) found that the employers of many of the unemployed did not pay unemployment 
insurance to them because of the financial squeeze during the 1990s and, as a result, 
the unemployed had no source of income during unemployment. Taken together, very 
little literature provides evidence that the effect of the social security system on anti-
poverty in urban areas of the PRC is inspiring. 
5.4 Asset Formation and Empowerment of the Poor 
As a productive factor, assets play an important role in determining the daily life of 
households. On the one hand, they can generate asset income that is usually an 
important income source for rich households. On the other hand, it can be sold out to 
hedge against negative shocks, such as illness or unemployment. Moser (1998) 
illustrates that the urban poor are managers of complex asset portfolios, and asset 
management affects both household poverty and vulnerability to poverty. In economics 
and sociology, there are four kinds of productive capital: human capital, political capital, 
social capital, and financial capital or financial asset. Economists and sociologists 
already provide ample evidence indicating the roles of these kinds of capital in the daily 
life of poor and non-poor households. In the context of the PRC economy, financial 
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assets include houses, bonds, deposits, securities, and other valuable assets. The 
education level of workers or the household head is generally used as a proxy of 
human capital. Being a member of the CCP or a cadre is generally used as a proxy  
of political capital. The number of relatives and/or friends is often used to measure 
social capital. 
In order to provide more direct evidence that asset formation is crucial for poor 
households in urban areas of the PRC, we further employed CHIPS 2002 data to 
investigate the role of financial assets in determining urban poverty. Figure 9 presents 
the relationship between the stock of financial assets and urban poverty, which is 
measured by the $2 poverty line in terms of income or consumption. From Figure 9, we 
can see a negative correlation between financial assets and the probability of falling 
into poverty, indicating that having more financial assets results in lower poverty. 
Figure 9: Effect of Financial Assets on Urban Poverty 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
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Table A7 in the Appendix presents the regression results of probit models, where  
the dependent variable is a dummy of whether a household’s average income or 
consumption expenditure is lower than the poverty line. The key independent variable 
is log (financial_K) which measures the stock of financial assets of an urban household. 
The other independent variables are the same as those in Table A5 in the Appendix. 
From the regression results, we find that the financial asset is significantly negative in 
all models, suggesting that having more financial assets would decrease the probability 
of falling into poverty. Similarly, edu_year and party_member indexing human capital 
and political capital are significantly negative in all regression models, indicating that 
human capital and political capital can play an important role in reducing urban poverty 
in the PRC. 
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In the past 3 decades, the economy of the PRC has witnessed radical structural 
changes, including urbanization, industrialization, and opening up, which created a 
miracle of economic growth. Until 2012, there were 260 million migrating peasants 
working in urban labor markets, which is one of the most important determinants  
of urbanization and economic development in the PRC. However, inequality also 
increased sharply during this process and urban poverty increased in the late 1990s, 
although rural poverty has shown an absolute decreasing trend since the early 1980s. 
Therefore, understanding the role of urbanization in enlarging inequality, in reducing 
rural poverty, and in increasing urban poverty in the late 1990s is an important mission  
of development economists. Relying on the present literature, official statistics, and 
household survey data in the PRC, this paper has summarized research findings on 
the relationship between urbanization, interregional and urban–rural inequality, and 
poverty, and provided further empirical evidence on the role of urbanization and 
government policies in urban poverty. Several important conclusions can be drawn 
from our discussion in this paper. 
On the one hand, urbanization has a significant effect on reducing both the poverty  
of rural residents and the poverty of migrating peasants, and, consequently, has a 
positive effect on narrowing the rural–urban income/consumption gap. Urban labor 
markets play an important role in this effect. The development strategy of giving priority 
to heavy industries and urban-biased policies adopted by the government in the early 
stages created a huge welfare gap between rural and urban citizens. After the opening 
up and economic reforms in 1978, the development of urban sectors gradually created 
a demand for rural labor and, as a result, more rural surplus labor migrated to urban 
labor markets. Although rural migrants have very low skills and human capital, they can 
still find jobs in labor-intensive sectors or the informal sector, where they can earn 
much higher wages than in rural sectors. We also find that even being employed in the 
informal sector, migrating peasants can still earn much higher wages than staying in 
their hometowns. Many empirical tests also show that with more surplus labor 
migrating into more productive sectors in urban areas, the left-behind peasants can get 
more production resources, such as cultivated land and physical capital. As a result, 
those peasants remaining in the rural sectors can also make more money than before. 
As a result of these channels, the rural–urban income or consumption gaps and 
provincial inequality measured by the Gini index have begun showing a slight declining 
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On the other hand, this paper finds that urbanization is positively correlated with urban 
poverty. This can be explained by the competition between migrating peasants and 
urban workers in the labor market, and the failure of the government’s anti-poverty 
policies in urban areas. Employing the urban sample from the population census of 
2005, Liu and Zhao (2009) found that, other things being equal, a 10% increase in 
rural–urban labor migration results in a 0.3% decrease in the employment rate of urban 
workers and a 0.65% decrease in the wages of urban workers. In this paper, we also 
find that the existence of an informal sector has a negative effect on the poverty of 
urban citizens. Being employed by the informal sector significantly increases the 
probability of falling into poverty for urban citizens. This result seems to be contrary to 
the effect of being employed by the informal sector on migrants’ poverty reduction. 
Here, should we keep in mind that although most migrating peasants are not in  
income poverty, but a large share of them are in consumption poverty, suggesting  
that they restrain their consumption when working in the urban PRC. Even though the 
development of the urban labor market has a negative effect on urban poverty 
reduction, we find that its effect is actually small. We believe that if the local or central 
government proposes suitable or efficient policies, there could be no negative effect. 
Unfortunately, we only find that the minimum wage has a positive effect on reducing 
urban poverty, while the effect of other policies, such as Di Bao and Minimum Living 
Standard, is limited. 
Although the empirical evidence provided in this paper does not show a generally 
positive effect of urbanization on reducing both rural poverty and urban poverty, and 
inequality in the PRC, we cannot take for granted that urbanization and urban 
concentration are harmful to economic development. Rural–urban labor migration and 
urbanization have important effects not only on reducing rural poverty and rural–urban 
gaps, but also on providing low-cost labor to urban sectors and providing services to 
urban citizens. Migrants contribute substantially to taxes to urban governments, but 
share very few public goods in urban areas, so the urban local governments should 
take the welfare of migrants into account when making policies. If urban governments 
propose employment policies to protect the employment of urban workers, this will 
make unemployed migrants more vulnerable than their urban counterparts and  
may result in a higher crime rate. If urban governments do not pay attention to the 
residential segregation of migrants, there is a danger of fomenting criminal activities, 
which will pose a great challenge to city management. Therefore, a more inclusive 
policy package that is not discriminatory towards migrants during the urbanization 
process could be a win-win strategy. 
These conclusions help us understand the role of urbanization, labor markets, and 
government policies in urban poverty, inequality, and rural poverty in the most 
populous economy in the world, and shed light on the policymaking in the PRC and in 
other developing economies to help find a way for a more balanced and harmonious 
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APPENDIX 
Following the methodology described in the box, the headcount ratio, the Gini index, 
and the Theil index used in this paper were deduced from the two grouped household 
data from the provincial statistical yearbooks. The first set of data is on the share of 
households within different income intervals, and the second one is on the household 
size under different income intervals.1 
On Shorrocks and Wan’s (2008) “Ungrouping Income Distributions” 
Assume a Lorenz curve with (𝑚 + 1)  coordinates ( 𝑝𝑘∗ ,𝐿𝑘∗ ) , where 𝑝𝑘∗  and 𝐿𝑘∗   
(𝑘 = 1,2, … ,𝑚) refer respectively to the cumulative shares in the total population 
and in total income of income classes 1 to k. And 𝑝0∗ = 𝐿0∗ = 0 . Once all 
observations are normalized by the overall mean of the distribution, the actual 
mean µ𝑘
∗  of class k becomes: 
µ𝑘
∗ = 𝐿𝑘∗ −𝐿𝑘−1∗
𝑝𝑘
∗−𝑝𝑘−1
∗            𝑘 = 1 to 𝑚 (1) 
The goal is to obtain a synthetic sample of n equally weighted observations whose 
overall mean is 1. These n observations are partitioned into m non-overlapping  
and ordered groups, each having 𝑚𝑘 = 𝑛(𝑝𝑘∗ − 𝑝𝑘−1∗ ) observations. Call 𝑥𝑘𝑖 the 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
observation in class k, the mean of this class based on the synthetic data is µ𝑘 . 
The algorithm proposed by Shorrocks and Wan (2008) includes two stages. The  
first step is to generate an initial sample with a unitary mean based on a 
parametric model fitted to the grouped data. See Ryu and Slottje (1999) for a 
survey of various parametrizations of the Lorenz curve. In the second stage, the 
algorithm adjusts the initial synthetic observations to ensure µ𝑘
∗  = µ𝑘. 
  
1  Shorrocks and Wan (2008) chose to generate the initial sample on the basis of a lognormal distribution. 
For more details, see Shorrocks and Wan (2008). 
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Table A1: Inequality Measures in Urban PRC 
 Gini index Theil index Observation 
1981 0.3143 0.1709 6 
1982 0.2978 0.1571 8 
1983 0.2988 0.1543 7 
1984 0.3087 0.1643 7 
1985 0.2944 0.1560 7 
1986 0.2864 0.1525 5 
1987 0.3053 0.1703 6 
1988 0.2856 0.1490 5 
1989 0.2626 0.1288 4 
1990 0.2313 0.1089 5 
1991 0.1779 0.0542 5 
1992 0.1850 0.0567 6 
1993 0.1736 0.0553 8 
1994 0.1939 0.0638 8 
1995 0.1868 0.0569 8 
1996 0.2108 0.0739 11 
1997 0.2212 0.0814 9 
1998 0.2186 0.0799 11 
1999 0.2073 0.0714 15 
2000 0.2053 0.0698 14 
2001 0.2215 0.0820 18 
2002 0.2330 0.0933 17 
2003 0.2349 0.0927 18 
2004 0.2418 0.1008 15 
2005 0.2323 0.0921 19 
2006 0.2364 0.0988 19 
2007 0.2488 0.1072 20 
2008 0.2548 0.1120 21 
2009 0.2586 0.1150 21 




ADBI Working Paper 584 Zhang 
 
Table A2: Variable Definitions Using Provincial Panel Data 
Variable Definition 
pov_r_1.25 Headcount ratio in rural areas measured by $1.25 poverty line 
pov_r_2 Headcount ratio in rural areas measured by $2 poverty line 
pov_u_1.25 Headcount ratio in urban areas measured by $1.25 poverty line 
pov_u_2 Headcount ratio in urban areas measured by $2 poverty line 
gini_all Provincial level Gini index 
theil_all Provincial level Theil index 
urban_rural_gap Income ratio between urban and rural citizens 
urbanization Share of urban population 
logavgdp Per capita GDP (CNY, in log) 
gdp1_ratio Share of GDP of the primary industry 
gdp2_ratio Share of GDP of the secondary industry 
fdi_gdp Ratio of FDI to GDP 
export_gdp Ratio of export to GDP 
import_agr Ratio of import to GDP 
timetrend Time trend variable 
Table A3: Effect of Urbanization on Poverty and Inequality  
in the People’s Republic of China 
(Fixed Effect Model) 
 Pov_r_2 Pov_u_2 Gini_all Theil_all Urban_rural_gap 
urbanization –0.339*** 0.713*** –0.143*** –0.131*** –0.970*** 
 (0.0778) (0.0669) (0.0328) (0.0480) (0.2030) 
logavgdp –0.179*** –0.183*** 0.0344*** 0.0479*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0092) (0.0044) (0.0064) (0.0262) 
gdp1_ratio –0.2400 0.608*** 0.0136 0.0653 –2.234*** 
 (0.1510) (0.1490) (0.0684) (0.1000) (0.4240) 
gdp2_ratio –0.426*** 0.0041 0.0761 0.201*** –0.0014 
 (0.1090) (0.1120) (0.0487) (0.0712) (0.3300) 
fdi_gdp 1.16e-05* 0.0000 7.91e-06*** 6.90e-06* 8.53e-06* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
export_gdp 0.0000 –2.11e-05*** –7.71e-06*** –9.25e-06** –0.000127*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
import_gdp –1.44e-05** 1.66e-05*** 0.0000 0.0000 3.27e-05** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
timetrend 0.000511* –0.0004 –0.000302*** –0.0002 0.00493*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0008) 
Observation 512 517 418 418 725 
R2 0.886 0.791 0.549 0.528 0.622 
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Table A4: Effect of Urbanization on Poverty and Inequality  
in the People’s Republic of China 
(Random Effect Model) 
 Pov_r_2 Pov_u_2 Gini_all Theil_all Urban_rural_gap 
urbanization –0.302*** 0.671*** –0.187*** –0.179*** –1.613*** 
 –0.0674 –0.0577 –0.0303 –0.0446 –0.1990 
logavgdp –0.186*** –0.185*** 0.0386*** 0.0526*** 0.273*** 
 –0.0088 –0.0083 –0.0041 –0.0060 –0.0261 
gdp1_ratio –0.327** 0.498*** 0.0186 0.0664 –2.327*** 
 –0.1410 –0.1370 –0.0668 –0.0977 –0.4330 
gdp2_ratio –0.450*** 0.0388 0.0389 0.152** –0.5440 
 –0.1060 –0.1020 –0.0484 –0.0707 –0.3370 
fdi_gdp 0.0000 0.0000 8.70e-06*** 7.67e-06** 1.06e-05** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
export_gdp 0.0000 –2.14e-05*** –5.04e-06* 0.0000 –9.79e-05*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
import_agr –1.21e-05** 1.43e-05*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
timetrend 0.000602** –0.0002 –0.000427*** –0.000335** 0.00269*** 
 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0001 –0.0002 –0.0008 
east 0.106*** 0.0595*** 0.0519*** 0.0735*** 0.507*** 
 –0.0264 –0.0200 –0.0132 –0.0208 –0.0898 
central –0.302*** 0.671*** –0.187*** –0.179*** –1.613*** 
 –0.0674 –0.0577 –0.0303 –0.0446 –0.1990 
constant 1.310** 1.870*** 0.900*** 0.403 –3.971** 
 –0.527 –0.495 –0.228 –0.333 –1.723 
Observation 512 517 418 418 725 
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Table A5: Employment in the Informal Sector and Income Poverty  
in Urban People’s Republic of China 
(Probit Model) 
 Income Poverty Consumption Poverty 
 $1.25 $2 $1.25 $2 
no_informal   0.387*** 0.307*** 
  (0.0742) (0.0390) 
ratio_informal 0.474*** 0.460***   
(0.112) (0.0641)   
age 0.0871* 0.00791 0.0778** 0.0245 
(0.0495) (0.0214) (0.0382) (0.0181) 
age_square –0.00116** –0.000300 –0.00113*** –0.000533*** 
(0.000531) (0.000222) (0.000393) (0.000180) 
male 0.101 0.281*** 0.210** 0.295*** 
(0.114) (0.0656) (0.106) (0.0598) 
edu_year –0.0840*** –0.0989*** –0.0899*** –0.100*** 
(0.0182) (0.0102) (0.0159) (0.00897) 
partymember –0.488*** –0.440*** –0.596*** –0.477*** 
(0.156) (0.0747) (0.144) (0.0664) 
minority 0.0454 –0.227 –0.00323 –0.219 
(0.235) (0.155) (0.220) (0.144) 
depend_ratio 2.058*** 1.866*** 2.142*** 1.738*** 
(0.314) (0.166) (0.263) (0.133) 
east –0.324** –0.415*** –0.346** –0.348*** 
(0.145) (0.0783) (0.135) (0.0717) 
central 0.0518 0.0451 0.0670 0.0841 
(0.121) (0.0683) (0.109) (0.0623) 
constant –4.074*** –1.320** –3.889*** –1.590*** 
(1.174) (0.535) (0.960) (0.472) 
Observation 6,843 5,886 6,843 5,886 
Pseudo R2 0.2032 0.1886 0.2148 0.1788 
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Table A6: Effect of Minimum Wage on Urban Poverty Reduction 
 Random Effect Models Fixed Effect Models 
 Pov_u_1.25 Pov_u_2 Pov_u_1.25 Pov_u_2 
logmini_wage –0.0403* –0.0752 –0.0545** –0.0963** 
 (0.0215) (0.0459) (0.0222) (0.0447) 
urbanization 0.149** 0.652*** 0.548*** 1.446*** 
 (0.0703) (0.164) (0.133) (0.269) 
logavgdp –0.0051 –0.0853*** 0.0306 –0.0062 
 (0.0146) (0.0326) (0.0219) (0.0441) 
gdp1_ratio 0.319** 1.125*** 0.260* 0.885*** 
 (0.125) (0.271) (0.147) (0.296) 
gdp2_ratio –0.0506 –0.142 –0.231** –0.604*** 
 (0.0924) (0.205) (0.112) (0.226) 
fdi_gdp 1.92e-07 8.98e-08 4.56e-07 5.56e-07 
 (6.84e-07) (1.46e-06) (7.01e-07) (1.41e-06) 
export_gdp –1.29e-06 –9.88e-06 –6.45e-06 –1.58e-05 
 (4.59e-06) (1.04e-05) (5.87e-06) (1.18e-05) 
import_agr –2.73e-06 –6.44e-06 –1.93e-06 –3.51e-06 
 (3.20e-06) (6.92e-06) (3.45e-06) (6.95e-06) 
east 0.0339 0.144*   
 (0.0325) (0.0855)   
central 0.0320 0.141   
 (0.0347) (0.0902)   
timetrend –0.0012 –0.0052 –0.0095** –0.0238** 
 (0.0030) (0.0065) (0.0046) (0.0094) 
constant 2.598 11.26 19.00** 48.28*** 
 (5.779) (12.65) (9.113) (18.37) 
Observation 161 160 160 160 
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Table A7: Asset Formation and Poverty in Urban PRC 
(Probit Model) 
 Income Poverty Consumption Poverty 
$1.25 $2 $1.25 $2 
ln(Financial_K) –0.0963*** –0.107*** –0.0854*** –0.0924*** 
(0.0130) (0.00826) (0.00948) (0.00698) 
age 0.0810** 0.0249 –0.0187 –0.0151 
(0.0388) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.0128) 
age_square –0.00114*** –0.000526*** 3.23e-05 –5.94e-05 
(0.000401) (0.000183) (0.000191) (0.000126) 
male 0.166 0.271*** 0.532*** 0.455*** 
(0.108) (0.0610) (0.0811) (0.0459) 
edu_year –0.0851*** –0.0952*** –0.0811*** –0.0887*** 
(0.0165) (0.00925) (0.0104) (0.00673) 
party_member –0.543*** –0.426*** –0.273*** –0.219*** 
(0.150) (0.0682) (0.0747) (0.0452) 
minority 0.136 –0.0988 –0.0559 0.0284 
(0.220) (0.143) (0.169) (0.101) 
depend_ratio 1.300*** 1.173*** 0.681*** 0.680*** 
(0.216) (0.120) (0.135) (0.0857) 
east –0.257* –0.258*** –0.0825 –0.338*** 
(0.138) (0.0735) (0.0943) (0.0549) 
central 0.0447 0.0554 0.439*** 0.293*** 
(0.111) (0.0634) (0.0782) (0.0475) 
constant –2.632*** –0.400 –0.395 0.873** 
(0.955) (0.474) (0.517) (0.341) 
Observation 6843 6843 6843 6843 
Pseudo R2 0.2377 0.2079 0.1729 0.1615 
Source: Urban samples from the Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002. 
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